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Abstract: The intrinsic difficulties in building realistic climate models and in 
providing complete, reliable and meaningful observational datasets, and the 
conceptual impossibility of testing theories against data imply that the usual 
Galilean scientific validation criteria do not apply to climate science. The 
different epistemology pertaining to climate science implies that its answers 
cannot be singular and deterministic; they must be plural and stated in 
probabilistic terms. Therefore, in order to extract meaningful estimates of 
future climate change from a model, it is necessary to explore the model’s 
uncertainties. In terms of societal impacts of scientific knowledge, it is 
necessary to accept that any political choice in a matter involving complex 
systems is made under unavoidable conditions of uncertainty. Nevertheless, 
detailed probabilistic results in science can provide a baseline for a sensible 
process of decision making. 
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1 Introduction 
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary principle approach 
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there 
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.” 
Principle 15, United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (Rio de Janeiro, 1992). 
 
The climate is defined as the mean physical state of the climatic system, which is 
constituted by atmosphere, hydrosphere, cryosphere, lithosphere and biosphere, which 
are intimately interconnected. Therefore, the climate is determined by a set of 
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time-averages of quantities that describe the structure and the behaviour of the various 
parts of the climatic system, as well as by the correlations among them (Peixoto and 
Oort, 1992). 
In the very definition of climate there is an ambiguity and an element of subjectivity 
because the extension of the time interval over which the statistics are made is not 
determined a priori, but is operationally chosen depending on the goal of the research.  
The presence of such a weak foundation strongly determines all the features of 
climate science. This weakness does not imply that this is a bad science, as stated by 
various politicians and opinion makers around the world, but it is a natural consequence 
of the fact that the system, subject to the studies of the climate scientists, is extremely 
complex. This complexity of the climatic system is such that the feedback between the 
various parts play an essential role. It makes little sense to define single elements and 
processes, when it is more sensible to consider it as a non separable ‘body’, a ‘living 
organism’ which cannot be solved, i.e. explained in simple terms, as the origin of the 
word ‘complex’1 explains. Therefore, it is conceptually incorrect to expect that climate 
science could provide answers having comparable precision and similar structure to 
those provided by sciences that investigate less complex systems.2 The complete 
understanding of the climate system is an open problem that may never be solved: this 
makes the study of 
the climate a scientific enterprise of exceptional interest. The urgency and the pressure 
for providing the policymakers with information that is necessary for the 
implementation of long-sighted policies gives climate science an extremely relevant 
sociopolitical role which, in turn, contributes to shaping the structure, goals and 
priorities of climate science. The latest report (Houghton et al., 2001) of the 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC; see, http://www.ipcc.ch) has recently 
been criticized for lacking quantitative estimations of the uncertainties of the projections 
of climate change (Reilly et al., 2001). An assessment of such uncertainties is needed in 
order to provide the governments with clear baselines to be able to initiate a process of 
rational decision making.  
In order to correctly interpret the subsequently presented results obtained by some 
research teams in terms of quantitative evaluation of the uncertainties relating to the 
increase in mean global temperature a century from now, it is necessary to first present 
the main features of climate science.      
2 Uncertainties in climate science  
Due to the complexity of the system, climate dynamics is chaotic and is characterized by 
a large natural variability on different temporal scales that would cause non-trivial 
difficulties in detecting trends in statistically relevant terms, even if the observational 
data were absolutely precise. 
The actual situation is much more problematic because even for the atmosphere, 
which is the observationally best-known component of the climatic system, the database 
of observations having global extension, good reliance and good temporal frequency go 
back in time no more than 4–5 decades. For each location, these observations are 
essentially temporally-averaged data for temperature, pressure and precipitation, which 
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have been collected by several research centres, especially meteorological institutes, 
around the globe. 
These collections of data about past climatology usually feature a relatively low 
degree of reciprocal synchronic coherence and individually present problems of 
diachronic coherence, due to changes in the strategies of data gathering with time. 
Furthermore, especially for the oldest years, some data are not available: they have been 
lost or their reliability is very low due to past technical failures or simply because they 
have not been collected.  
The most precise instruments for the detailed simulation of climate dynamics are the 
General Circulation Models (GCMs), which describe the coupled evolution of 
the various components of the climatic system through the inclusion of a mathematical 
description of the main physical, chemical and biological processes. The complexity of 
these models is such that they generate a natural variability which is comparable to the 
observed one.       
The quantification of many processes playing major roles in climate dynamics is still 
clearly incomplete. In term of chemistry and biology, there is great uncertainty about the 
determination of the natural emissions of greenhouse gases and the absence of a good, 
relatively detailed understanding of the carbon cycle. There are also substantial 
uncertainties on the correct values to assign to fundamental parameters of the physics of 
the system, like climate sensitivity3 and the efficiency of the oceanic heat uptake from 
the atmosphere. It is not clear how the dynamics of these processes depend on climatic 
variables, so that it is not easy to understand how intense and of which sign —positive 
or negative — could be the feedbacks they could trigger in the process of climatic 
change. 
It is also not possible to rule out the fact that essential elements may have not yet 
been discovered, such as nonlinearities able to generate so-called climatic surprises, i.e. 
rapid climatic changes that can take place in conditions of increased instability. A well-
known example of these phenomena is the breakdown of the thermohaline circulation, 
whose occurrence could drive Northern Europe to a much colder climate than at present 
(Rahmstorf, 1997). 
The limitations of the present GCMs are not just due to the previous conceptual 
difficulties: many of the known processes are implemented in the models with simplified 
dynamics in order to reduce the computer time needed for each simulation.   
Each study, aimed at providing possible future scenarios, should also take into 
consideration the uncertainties related to future anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases. Since these generate the forcing which drives the system out of its natural 
equilibrium, it is reasonable to expect that the uncertainties in anthropogenic emissions 
have a major role in determining the uncertainty in climatic response. Consistent with 
the precision we require in describing processes of analogous importance (a sort of 
respect of the degree of complexity could be invoked), the data fed into the model to 
describe the anthropogenic emissions, considered in this context as the results of the 
process named ‘human society’, should be generated by a global economic model. 
Therefore, the uncertainties in the emissions should result from the uncertainties 
intrinsic to the economic model. The ‘organicity’ of the climate system requires all parts 
to be interconnected, so that the economic model should be coupled to the model 
describing the strictly speaking natural phenomena; for this purpose a good evaluation 
of the costs of the impacts of climate change is of the utmost importance.  
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Considering greenhouse gas emission only as an uncoupled factor capable of 
influencing the climate is conceptually unsatisfying and dangerous, since it implicitly 
assumes that human choices could be independent of the state of the environment where 
they themselves live.    
In first approximation, the CO2 emissions are closely related to global economic 
quantities, such as economic growth, energy-intensiveness of the economy, and shares of 
the various sources of energy.  
The emissions of other greenhouse gases, such as CH4, CFCs and N2O, which now 
already contribute to a good part of the total positive radiative forcing, as well as aerosol 
emissions,4 depend more precisely on the details of the economy. 
The presence of structural uncertainties (due to the choices made when a model is 
built on which processes and feedbacks are described and how they are described) and of 
parametric uncertainties (due to the lack of knowledge on quantities which characterize 
the climatic system), implies that every model used to generate projections about future 
climate change is a priori false, or better, weak in its descriptive power. Climate science 
does not have a laboratory where theories could be tested against experiments; every 
model can be tested only against data from the past, which are not necessarily precise. 
The natural variability of both the model and of the real system contributes to blur the 
line between a failed and a passed test. Anyway, a positive result would not at all 
guarantee that the model is able to provide good future projections while at most we can 
conclude from a negative result that the model does not work properly. 
The distance from Galilean science is so wide that it is impossible to apply the usual 
scientific validation criteria to the results of climate science. 
The different epistemology pertaining to climate science implies that its answers 
cannot be singular and deterministic, while they must be plural and stated in 
probabilistic terms. 
The necessity of providing explicit suggestions for the formulation and the 
implementation of global long-sighted policies has been a fundamental stimulation to 
climate science. This original aspect of contamination is clearly identifiable, observing 
the strong interaction and close interconnection between the scientific community, 
public opinion, governments, and private companies. This linkage touches even what 
the scientists have historically been very jealous of: determination of interesting 
problems and the creation of conceptual instruments used in defining the level of 
precision of the results that is required in research, and of conceptual instruments used 
in determining the level of precision that has been obtained in the single project.  
3 A possible strategy  
The aforementioned discussion explains why it is not sensible to expect to obtain 
qualitatively better results with the availability of more and more powerful computers 
alone, which would make it possible to get a finer resolution of the 3-D grid describing 
the planet and to have a more precise implementation of the single processes in the 
models.  
While there are instruments to analyse the uncertainties arising from the natural 
variability, it is more difficult to deal with the structural and parametric uncertainties of 
the models. These uncertainties are intrinsic and thinking of them as obstacles 
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preventing us from reaching some form of truth is epistemologically incorrect since this 
approach reflects a reductionistic attitude which, as already explained, is in this context 
quite misleading.     
An epistemologically correct analysis takes into account those uncertainties and tries 
to figure out how they influence the uncertainties on climatic change projections: the 
scientifically-relevant and sensitive results can be expressed only in probabilistic terms. 
The structural uncertainties cannot be studied using only one model: one can expect 
to analyse them by comparing different models following a horizontal and vertical 
conceptual hierarchical path. The horizontal comparison is the comparative study of the 
results generated by models sharing a roughly common level of complexity, but having 
been implemented in different ways by different people. The vertical comparison is the 
comparative study of the results obtained by a family of models, each built as an 
extension and complexification of another one starting from an initial simple parent,5 
thus creating a natural hierarchy of increasing complexity. 
The analysis of parametric uncertainties is conceptually simpler and can be thought 
of as a study where several runs of the same model evolve from the same initial 
conditions but with different values of the most relevant uncertain parameters. The 
uncertainty on a parameter becomes a probability density function related to its value; if 
independent studies restrict the value of the parameter within a certain interval (Forest 
et al., 2001; 2002), the above-mentioned function should reduce to zero outside such an 
interval. By using a Monte Carlo method,6 it is possible to compile the statistics for the 
most relevant projected quantities, for which the probability distribution functions are 
obtained. Setting all the parameters at their mean value except one, it is possible to 
understand how strongly the uncertainty of the latter influences the uncertainties on the 
projections.  
These experiments of experiments need many runs in order to provide statistically 
relevant results. Therefore, single research institutes do not have enough computer 
power to study parametric uncertainties on the best GCMs available, since they need 
time periods of the order of months just to complete one simulation even on powerful 
machines. On the contrary, simpler models gauged to give results compatible with those 
coming from hierarchically higher relatives can be used.  
Two studies where parametric uncertainties have been treated in the aforementioned 
way have been recently presented. The parameters’ values have been confined within 
intervals deduced from either independent scientific investigations or, where this was 
not possible, from the judgment of experts in the field (Morgan and Henrion, 1990).  
In Wigley and Raper (2001), a 2-D climate model (Wigley and Raper, 1992) has 
been used to produce a probability density function of the mean global temperature 
change between 1990 and 2100. The authors have considered uncertainties affecting the 
climate sensitivity, the carbon cycle, the oceanic heat uptake from the atmosphere, 
the net effects of the aerosols, and the future paths of emissions of greenhouse gases. In 
Figure 1 we present the results of this study for the distributions of the 1990–
2100 warming for three cases, which differ on the choices of the probability distribution 
of value of a parameter and on the inclusion of the analysis if the effect of the presence 
of uncertainty of another one (for more details, see, Wigley and Raper, 2001). In the 
most complete and realistic case (represented in Figure 1 by the thick line), the 90% 
confidence interval of the 1990–2100 mean temperature increase is 1.7–4.9 °C, while 
the median value is 3.1 °C.  
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Figure 1 Probability distribution function of the global mean temperature increase between 
1990 and 2100 (the thick line refers to the most realistic case). Taken with permission from 
Wigley and Raper (2001).  
In Webster at al.7 the influence on the ten-year average global mean temperature 
variation between 1990 and the decade 2090–2100 (Figure 2) of the uncertainties of 
both the natural and the economic parameters have been studied using the MIT 
Integrated Global System Model (IGSM; see, 
http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/if.html). This comprehends a climate model 
(Prinn et al., 1999) whose components are a 2-D atmosphere with explicit treatment of 
the chemistry of the most relevant species, a 
2-D ocean, and terrestrial ecosystem. The climate model receives as inputs the 
greenhouse gases emissions resulting from a global economic model,8 which is also part 
of the IGSM. The 90% confidence interval obtained for the 1990–2100 temperature 
increase is 1.1–4.5 °C, and the median value is 2.3 °C. 
These studies represent a real revolution in the methodology of climate science and 
contain information that can be used in the implementation of policies. They represent a 
large leap forward with respect to the information provided in the IPCC reports.  
The IPCC third report (TAR; Houghton et al., 2001) for the same time frame 
considered in the previous studies presents for the mean global temperature increase the 
interval 1.4–5.8 °C without specifying the probability density function that sits over this 
range of variation. Such an interval has been deduced through expert elicitation based 
on the results obtained by the most prominent GCMs.  
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Figure 2 Probability distribution function of the ten-year average global mean temperature 
increase between 1990 and the 2090–2100 decade.7 
It is wrong to think that the previously discussed results are less relevant than those of 
the IPCC, because the latter have been derived from simulations of more powerful 
models. The previously discussed epistemology implies that only a detailed and 
systematic treatment of the uncertainties can provide meaningful results. Anyway, the 
IPCC study cannot be considered an analysis of structural uncertainties, even if 
the results of several models are taken into account. This is because the comparison is 
only made horizontally, and because no robust quantitative method of compiling the 
statistics for the output variable from the results of the various models has been 
presented. These are the reasons why a probability density function could not be 
proposed, thus providing the readers with a rather limited amount of information. This 
exemplifies that the most powerful model is not necessarily the best one to achieve any 
kind of goal: the flexibility, which is typical of simpler models, can be more important 
and effective than the ability to reproduce the details of the evolution of every single part 
of the system. 
A new cutting-edge strategy for the study of the uncertainties in climate change has 
been proposed by a UK-based project led by M. Allen and D. Stainforth (see, 
http://www.climateprediction.net). The goal of this project, which is presently in its 
preliminary phase, is to explore the parametric uncertainties of various versions of the 
state-of-the-art 3-D climate model developed at the Hadley Meteorological Centre (see, 
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http://www/metoffice.gov.uk/research/hadleycentre/models/modeltypes.html). In order 
to overcome the problem of the huge amount of computer power needed to study the 
uncertainties of models presenting such an high degree of complexity, the scientists 
working at the www.climateprediction.net project propose to distribute the computing 
among thousands of ordinary PCs, belonging to private citizens or institutions that wish 
to participate in the experiments. The strategy is to use the idle time of the computers 
to perform model runs, along similar lines to the Seti@home project (see, 
http://www.setiathome.ssl.berkeley.edu/index.html).     
The results presented by Wigley et al. (2001) and by Webster et al.7 are extremely 
interesting and useful to address the task of evaluating the global costs of climate 
change. These are usually estimated as functions of the variations of global mean 
climatic variables (Nordhaus, 1994), especially of the temperature.9 These functions 
contain parameters describing the ability and the possibility to adapt to and mitigate the 
climatic change. One of the substantially correct features of these functions is that they 
have a strongly non-linear structure, which can be exponential or polynomial.10 These 
functional forms describe costs that almost vanish if the extent of the climatic change is 
small, thanks to relatively cheap mitigation and adaptation policies, while they explode 
if the changes exceed values beyond which an elastic response of the society is not 
possible anymore and the chances of bad climatic surprises is high. These functions 
provide a sort of quantitative framework of a precautionary principle. The fact that the 
costs are intrinsically non-linear with the climatic changes implies that the IPCC results 
do not provide sufficient information for an intelligent process of decisionmaking. Since 
the costs of the climate change increase by orders of magnitude, from the lower to the 
upper bound of the interval of variation of the global mean temperature change from 
1990–2100, the detailed form of the probability distribution function of this variable is 
necessary to estimate the expected value of the costs. Moreover, in a sensible process of 
decisionmaking, in order to wisely apply the precautionary principle, it is at least 
necessary to know if the probability of a catastrophic scenario (e.g. ∆T > 5 °C) can be 
reasonably estimated as being of the order of 1%, 0.01% or 0.0001%. 
4 Conclusions 
The previously presented studies do not absolutely have the last word in terms of climate 
change projections; their main merit is that they present an epistemologically correct 
instrument of investigation. In terms of research strategy, the idea of distributed 
computing proposed by the www.climateprediction.net research group might initiate an 
entirely new generation of scientific investigations on complex systems. No complete 
studies of the effects of model uncertainties in climate change projections have yet been 
done, even if very promising work in the field of quantification of uncertainties arising 
from the bias between atmospheric model and the actual system is ongoing (Smith, 
1997; 2000). 
These studies and future studies along these lines can provide useful information for 
the process of decisionmaking on a global scale, whose implementation is needed in the 
short term. It is necessary to reformulate the idea that scientific investigations can 
provide simple truths that eventually constitute a baseline for the implementation of 
policies. In any matter involving complex systems, it is necessary to accept that any 
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political choice has to be taken in intrinsic, and thus unavoidable, conditions of 
uncertainty. Usually it is proposed to delay the creation of a binding legislation on 
greenhouse gas emissions until scientific answers of improved precision provide better-
defined suggestions for policies able to prevent environmentally adverse consequences 
within a context of economic efficiency. This is derived from the implicit assumption 
that in future, in light of the improved knowledge of the climatic system, the past 
conservation policies would prove exceedingly stringent. This assumption that the 
present ideas about climate change are biased towards catastrophism is a wrongly 
optimistic superficial attitude. There are several evidences that in the recent and distant 
past the climate of our planet experienced sudden changes, and it is clear that the rapid 
and violent forcing due to greenhouses gas emissions enhances the chances of the 
manifestation of bad climatic surprises (Rahmstorf et al., 2000). 
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Endnotes 
1 ‘Complex’ comes from the past participle of the Latin verb complector, -ari (to 
entwine). Note the difference between the precise meaning of ‘complex’ and 
‘complicated’, which comes from the past participle of the Latin verb complico, 
-are (to put together). 
2 The science relevant to genetically modified organisms also investigates complex 
systems. 
3 Defined as the difference between the mean global temperature at equilibrium, 
corresponding to an atmospheric CO2 concentration which is double and equal, 
respectively, to the atmospheric CO2 concentration during the pre-industrial age 
(~280 parts per million). 
4 See, for example, the paper by Hansen and Sato; available at 
 http://www.giss.nasa.gov/gpol/papers/2001/2001_HansenSato.pdf. 
5 On the other hand, equivalently: each being the restriction and simplification of 
another one, starting from an initial complex parent. 
6 A given value of a parameter is used in the simulations with frequency 
proportional to the value of the probability distribution for such a value. 
7 See Webster et al.; available at 
 http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC_Rpt73.pdf. 
8 M.H. Babiker et al.; available at 
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http://web.mit.edu/globalchange/www/MITJPSPGC_Rpt71.pdf. 
9 The global costs should be computed as the sum of all the local costs. These 
essentially depend on the local features of the society, the environment and the 
climate change. Presently, it is not possible to give robust estimates for the latter. 
10 When the globe is divided into macro regions, the value of the parameters that 
uniquely determine the cost functions depend on the macro region considered, in 
order to take into account local differences in the ability and possibility to adapt to 
climate change. 
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